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3I. Introduction
A key concern in countries contemplating reasonably aggressive carbon pricing—and one that
has become still more prominent since the crisis, as they struggle to restore employment—is
the fear that their competitive position in world markets would be jeopardized by ‘carbon
leakage’ as production shifts elsewhere.1 The likelihood that any mitigation measures will be
strongly asymmetric, at least for coming years, amplifies this concern, which is reflected in the
inclusion in climate change legislation in both the EU2 and in proposals elsewhere (such as the
Waxman-Markey climate and energy bill in the U.S.) of provisions, for exposed
emissions-intensive sectors, for various forms of ‘border tax adjustment’ (BTA)3—meaning
the levying of some charge on imports, and remission of charge on exports, to the extent that
carbon prices are higher domestically than elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, the appropriateness or
not of such adjustments has been the focus of heated debate.
The theoretical literature has begun to address the linkages between climate (environment,
more generally) and trade policies that are the heart of this question. Much of it has focused on
non-cooperative policy formation, commonly characterizing nationally optimal policy (as in,
for instance, Markusen (1975), Baumol and Oates (1988) and Copeland (1996)) or desirable
directions of reform—whether for small or large economies—when one or other instrument,
environment or trade, is for some reason constrained away from the optimal: see, among
others, Copeland (1994), Hoel (1996), Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004) and Neary (2006)).
While this non-cooperative perspective is clearly an important one, an understanding of the
requirements of cooperative policy is also valuable. It would certainly be naive to imagine that
actual climate policies are entirely shaped to the collective good. But nor are they always
easily explained in terms of narrowly defined self-interest. The adoption of carbon pricing in
British Columbia, for instance, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (capping emissions
in several U.S. states) do almost nothing for global emissions, and hence for climate damage,
but do impose some local costs. And the EU is undertaking relatively aggressive mitigation
policies despite the fact that the costs to its members of adapting to climate change appear
quite low (and for some quite possibly negative).4 The motives behind these policies are no
doubt complex, including perhaps a concern (and some sense of historic guilt) for the harm
1Instructive discussions of these issues are in Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Sheldon (2006). Levinson and
Taylor (2008) provide empirical evidence that more stringent environmental regulation reduces exports.
2Adjustments of this kind, in the context of the EU Emission Trading System, are provided for in Directive
2009/29/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC.
3This has also been advocated by, for instance, Stiglitz (2006).
4The results in Obsterghaus and Reif (2010), for example, suggest that the fiscal costs of adaptation in the EU
would be around 16 billion euros per annum (in 2005 prices) by mid-century, though such figures are subject to
considerable uncertainty.
4that might be suered elsewhere and a desire to prod others into action (perhaps all overlain
with a fear that delaying action to deal with catastrophic eects could be still more costly). But
they certainly seem to reflect more than immediate and narrowly-defined self-interest. Even
without delving into motives, in any event, the implications of cooperative design in relation to
climate policies must be a central benchmark both given the commonplace rhetoric of
cooperation in this area—do policies rationalized from that perspective really make
sense?—and, perhaps above all, for assessing the appropriateness of whatever policy structures
do emerge. One would at least like to know if policies adopted could be improved in such a
way that all countries can benefit.
This collective perspective has, however, received very little attention in the literature (the sole
exception of which we are aware being the partial equilibrium treatment in Gros (2009)). The
aim in this paper is therefore to explore the interaction between climate and trade policies in a
cooperative setting. It does so by characterizing (generally constrained) Pareto-ecient
allocations within a standard general equilibrium model of competitive trade in many goods,
augmented by a climate-like production externality, in which potentially three sets of policy
instruments may be deployed: international lump-sum transfers, carbon pricing, and taris.
The first of these are naturally directed to equity concerns, moving the world around its utility
possibly frontier; the second are naturally targeted to controlling emissions—and the third
would have no role if the other two instruments were optimally deployed. Attention thus
focuses on the implications of various constraints on these instruments for the setting of the
others to achieve constrained Pareto-ecient outcomes. In doing so, the analysis unifies and
extends previous results on the links between climate and trade policies.
Within this broad class of issues, attention here focusses especially on the question of whether
there are circumstances in which some form of BTA is part of a globally ecient response to
climate change (or to any other environmental problem with broadly the same border-crossing
structure). By ‘border tax adjustment’ we shall mean, in the most general interpretation, tari
structures that in some direct way reflect dierences in national carbon prices. And of
particular interest is the possibility that this adjustment will take the very simple form
commonly envisaged in policy discussions—which is likely the only one conceivably
practicable—of setting a charge on imports equal to some notion of carbon tax ‘not paid’
abroad on imports, and remitting tax on exports in similar fashion.
There are of course many other issues raised by the possibility of BTA for carbon prices.
These include the questions of whether or not such adjustment is WTO-consistent (see, for
instance, Chapter 5 of OECD (2004), and McLure (2011)),5 very significant issues of
5There are precedents, notably in the US Superfund tax and, of particular relevance in the climate context, for
ozone-depleting chemicals.
5implementability (Moore, 2010); and, not least, the (perhaps limited) empirical significance of
the relative producer price eects of carbon pricing that might be adjusted for (Houser et al.
2008). Nor does the analysis here considers the potential merit of BTA as a credible device by
which countries implementing carbon pricing can encourage participation by others.6
Important though these issues are, they are not the concern here—which is with the pure
eciency case for climate-motivated border tax adjustment.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II sets out the model, which takes carbon taxation
to be the instrument of climate policy, and Section III then derives benchmark results for
collectively ecient carbon tax and tari policy when both these instruments can be freely set.
Section IV considers Pareto-ecient policies when carbon taxes and taris are constrained in
some countries, showing that there is indeed a case for some form of BTA, both (under weak
conditions) in the general sense above and (under strict ones) in the more precise sense of
practical policy discussions. Section V then compares these results with those of Markusen
(1975) for non-cooperative policy-making, and considers their applicability when carbon
pricing is by cap-and-trade rather than carbon taxation. Section VI concludes.
II. Modeling climate and trade policies
The framework is that of Keen and Wildasin (2004), modified to deal with pollution as a
by-product of production. We consider a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model of
international trade in which there are J countries indexed by the superscript j. In each country
there is a representative consumer and a private sector that produces (only) N tradeable
commodities. The N-vector of international commodity prices is denoted by w.7 (All vectors
are column vectors, and a prime indicates transposition). Trade is subject to trade taxes or
subsidies, denoted by the vector  j in country j; consistent with most-favored nation rules,
each country is assumed to apply the same tari rates to all others.8 The commodity price
vector in country j is then given by the N-vector p j = w +  j.9
The production of each commodity generates some pollutant—we have in mind carbon
6Participants themselves presumably gain from the BTAs, and non-participants would then benefit by imposing a
carbon price themselves, at least to the extent that since by doing so they would capture revenues otherwise
accruing to others (though terms of trade eects would also play a role).
7Though world prices are something of a fiction, in the sense that no private agent may trade at them, they do
matter for the revenues that national governments collect.
8As usual, the model is very general in allowing for all types of trade taxes and subsidies. If  ji > 0 (
j
i < 0) and
commodity i is imported by country j, then  ji is an import tari (import subsidy); if i is exported by country j
then  ji < 0 (
j
i > 0) is an export subsidy (export tax).
9Consumption taxes are excluded from the analysis as they would be irrelevant for countries that are
unconstrained in their use of taris and carbon taxes; and would complicate the formalities, with little additional
insight, for those that are constrained.
6emissions, though there are of course many other possible interpretations10—with the N-vector
z j denoting sectoral emissions in country j. Total emissions in country j are thus given by 0z j
where  is the N-vector of 1s; and global emissions, on which—as with the concentration of
greenhouse gases in the global atmosphere—damage in each country depends, are
k =
XJ
l=1
0zl : (1)
This damage is assumed to arise (only) directly in consumer welfare, not through production;
though perhaps not the most realistic assumption in the climate context, this helps relate our
results to most familiar analyses and results in the literature.11
The representative consumer of country j has preferences represented by the expenditure
function
e j(u j;p j; k) = min
x j
fp j0x j : U j

x j; k

 u jg ; (2)
with e jp the vector of compensated demands and e
j
k, assumed strictly positive in all countries,
the compensation required for a marginal increase in global emissions.
Emissions z j are subject to pollution taxes, given by the N-vector s j; these, note, may in
general be sector-specific.12 Production in country j is competitive and characterized by a
revenue function
r j(p j; s j) = max
y j;z j
fp j0y j   s j0z j :

y j; z j

2 T jg ; (3)
where T j is the technology set and y j is the (net) output of tradeable goods (the dependence on
underlying endowments being omitted for brevity). The revenue function in (3) is convex,
linearly homogeneous in (p j; s j) and assumed to be twice continuously dierentiable; it is also
assumed throughout that all r jss are non-singular.13 (The fossil fuels from whose use carbon
emissions arise are not explicitly identified, though they can be thought of as being amongst
the N commodities, since our interest here is not in their pricing). Hotelling’s lemma implies
that r jp is the vector of net supply functions for tradeable commodities; it also follows from (3)
that r js

p j; s j

=  z j: emissions are given by (minus) the derivative of the revenue function
with respect to the sectoral carbon tax rates.
Tax revenues from all sources are assumed to be returned to the domestic consumer in a lump
10And generalizations too. The analysis and main results are readily generalized to allow for M-types of
pollutants, and much the same analysis would also apply to pollutants whose emissions do not disperse uniformly
in the atmosphere.
11Kotsogiannis and Woodland (2012) show that allowing for emissions to instead enter production does not
change the essence of the results that follow here.
12As in, among others, Copeland (1994), Hoel (1996) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004).
13For the properties of the revenue function see Dixit and Normal (1980) and Woodland (1982).
7sum fashion. At some points, unrequited commodity transfers between countries will be
allowed; denoting by the N-vector  j that received by j, these must satisfyXJ
j=1
 j = 0N1 ; (4)
where 0c denotes the c-vector of zeroes. The consumer’s budget constraint in country j is thus
e j(u j;p j; k) = r j(p j; s j)   s j0r js

p j; s j

+  j0

e jp(u j;p j; k)   r jp

p j; s j

+ w0 j : (5)
This simply says that expenditure e j(u j;p j; k) must equal GDP, given by r j(p j; s j), plus carbon
tax revenues (s j0z j), tari revenue ( j0

e jp(u j;p j; k)   r jp

p j; s j

), and transfers received by
country j (w0 j).
Defining
m j  e jp(u j;p j; k)   r jp

p j; s j

; (6)
the vector of j’s net imports, market clearing requires thatXJ
j=1
m j = 0(N 1)1 ; (7)
where, by Walras’ Law, the market-clearing equation for the first commodity is dropped. The
same commodity is taken as numeraire, and without loss of generality, to be untaxed in all
countries: so  j1 = 0 and p
j
1 = 1 = w1, for j = 1; : : : ; J; it is also assumed throughout that, for
all j, m jp is non-singular.
Given taris  j and carbon tax vectors s j, for j = 1; : : : ; J, a vector of international transfers  j
satisfying (4), the market equilibrium conditions (7), and the national budget constraints (5),
the system may be solved for the equilibrium world price vector w and the vector of national
utilities u = (u1; : : : ; uJ)0.14
The analysis that follows uses Motzkin’s Theorem of the Alternative to characterize
Pareto-ecient carbon tax and tari structures. The necessary conditions for this are derived in
Appendix A. They involve variables  j that can be interpreted as the implicit social marginal
value—evaluated at the Pareto-ecient allocation being characterized—of the utility of
country j:15 if country i, say, is more ‘income-needy’ than country j, then i >  j. The
discussion and intuition can then proceed as if the problem were one of simply maximizing
14Dierentiability of all functions at the initial equilibrium is assumed. Standard assumptions hold so an
equilibrium exists (Woodland (1982)).
15This interpretation follows from the formalities in the Appendix A on noting that the conditions in
(A.15)-(A.16) are equivalent to those of maximizing a social welfare function 
(u) with marginal welfare weights

0u = y0u, the typical element of which is  j(e
j
u    j0e jpu) + v0e jpu. When taris and carbon taxes are
unconstrained, (B.4) then implies that  j = 
u j=e
j
u, so that the  j is the social marginal utility of income of
8some social welfare function, having marginal welfare weights  j, with the assurance that,
behind the scenes, whatever instruments are available can be used to translate what is then
expressed as an increase in social welfare into the Pareto improvements that are the ultimate
concern here.
III. The benchmark: Unconstrained carbon tax and tariff policies
To fix ideas, this section considers the relatively straightforward case in which there are no
constraints on the carbon taxes and taris that can be set in any country j: Then:16
Proposition 1 At any Pareto-ecient allocation:
(a) The vector of carbon taxes in country j is given by
 js j =
XJ
i=1
ieik

  0N1 ; (8)
so that for all j, s j =
PJ
i=1 
i jeik

, where i j = i= j and  j > 0; j = 1; : : : J:
(b) The tari vectors of any pair of countries j and i are collinear:
 j = i ji; j; i = 1; : : : ; J : (9)
Proof: See Appendix B. 
The interpretation of part (a) is straightforward, Pareto eciency requires that each country
sets its carbon tax in each sector n to equate the value of the revenue it would lose from a small
cut in its own emissions,  js jn, to the sum of the marginal environmental benefits conveyed to
all countries,
PJ
i=1 
ieik. An immediate implication, since the marginal damage from emissions
is the same whichever sector they originate in, is that each country should apply the same
carbon tax to all activities: within each country, carbon taxes are optimally uniform across
sectors. But while each country sets a single carbon tax rate, part (a) also shows that the level
of that tax generally diers across countries. Recalling the interpretation of  j, Pareto
eciency requires that more ‘income-needy’ countries impose lower carbon taxes. This is
intuitively natural, and to the same eect as the results of Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) and
Sandmo (2005, 2006)—and consistent too with much of the policy debate, which has
emphasized the lesser ability of lower income countries to cope with aggressive carbon
pricing. There is though one subtle dierence between this and previous results: here the
country j; more precisely, i= j is the social marginal value of income in country i relative to that in country j for
any social welfare function relative to which the allocation is optimal. When instruments are constrained, the
interpretation is complicated by the presence of taris and demand patterns.
16The notation q  0 means that all elements of the vector q are strictly positive.
9simple equity-based modification of the Pigovian rule applies even though distorting
taxes—taris—may also be deployed.
This brings us to part (b) of Proposition 1, which is more striking. To see why Pareto eciency
requires collinear tari vectors, consider some change in world prices that increases country
j’s import of good n by one unit, and increases i’s exports by one unit. With carbon taxes
optimally set, this increases the shadow value of j’s real income by  j jn and reduces that of i
by iin; Pareto eciency then requires that 
j
n =

i= j

in, and this can hold for all n only if
the tari vectors are collinear. The importance of this is in emphasizing that production
ineciency is generally part of a Pareto ecient allocation. To see this, recall that producer
prices in country j are p j = w +  j; this means that global production will be ecient—in the
narrow sense that it is impossible to increase global output of any good without reducing the
global output of some other—only if the tari vectors  j are the same for all countries. But this
is consistent with the collinearity result of Proposition 1(b) only if either  j = 0(N 1)1 for all
countries, or i j = i= j takes the same value for all j—which there is in general no reason to
suppose to be the case.
There is generally production ineciency in allocations characterized by Proposition 1 in a
broader sense too, reflecting also environmental concerns. Maximizing the net output of some
good without either reducing the net output of any other or increasing global emissions
requires that both producer prices p and carbon taxes s be equalized across countries.
Proposition 1 points to violations on both of these margins (or neither), driven by distributional
concerns: in each case, relative welfare weights shape the proportionality factor between the
(sectorally uniform) carbon taxes and taris applied by each country.
Proposition 1 applies whether or not international transfers between countries can be deployed.
If they can be then, of course, Pareto-eciency requires equalizing the  j across all countries.
Part (a) of Proposition 1 then implies that Pareto eciency requires the same level of carbon
taxes in every country, and part (b) that (with an appropriate normalization)  j = i = 0(N 1)1.
All Pareto-ecient allocations are thus characterized by production eciency. The same may
be true, however, even without international transfers. The reason is as in Keen and Wildasin
(2004) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004): if there are more goods on which the tari
rates may be varied than there are countries (and sucient rank in the corresponding matrix of
net exports), osetting taris can be designed so as to achieve any desired reallocation of tari
revenue between countries. Explicit transfers are then redundant. Hence:
Proposition 2 If there are no constraints on lump transfers between countries, or there are at
least as many goods as countries (and an appropriate rank condition is satisfied), then, at any
Pareto-ecient allocation:
10
(a) The vector of carbon taxes in every country j is given by
s j = s =
XJ
i=1
eik

  0N1; j = 1; : : : ; J ; (10)
and
(b) taris are zero in every country
 j = 0(N 1)1; j = 1; : : : ; J : (11)
Proof: See Appendix C. 
Carbon taxes are thus set at first best Pigovian levels, and tari policy has no substantive role.
In the relatively unconstrained world of Propositions 1 and 2, there is thus an alignment of
instruments with objectives that is straightforward and as expected: with international transfers
dealing with distributional concerns, carbon taxes are addressed to the climate externality and
taris—except in so far as they may be needed to substitute for explicit transfers—are
redundant. Importantly for present purposes, there is nothing in Propositions 1 and 2 that is in
the nature of a border tax adjustment: no sign, that is, of the ecient tari in any country
reflecting the dierence between its own carbon tax and that of the other countries.17 A case
for BTA can thus arise only in more constrained circumstances, and it is this possibility that we
now turn.
IV. Pareto efficiency and the role of border tax adjustments
Imagine then that for some reason—perhaps unmodeled political constraints—not all carbon
taxes and taris are freely variable. Specifically, suppose—going to something of the opposite
extreme to the circumstances of the previous section—that they can be freely set in country h
but everywhere else are fixed at arbitrary levels. We refer to these countries as ‘unconstrained’
and ‘constrained’ respectively (and occasionally to h as ‘home’), and will have in mind in the
informal discussion that carbon taxes in the latter—which may be sector-specific—are ‘too
low’ (relative to the first-best Pigovian carbon-tax). The global economy is thus constrained18
inside the global utility possibility frontier, and the question is: how should carbon taxes and
taris then be set in country h?
For clarity, it is useful to approach this in two steps. Subsection A. deals first with the case in
which distributional issues can be dealt with by international lump-sum transfers. This,
17In the latter case, of course, there is simply no dierence in carbon taxes.
18Leaving aside the case in which the arbitrary rates in all unconstrained countries happen to coincide with those
of some Pareto ecient allocation.
11
together with further standard simplifying assumptions, gives rise to some sharp results.
Subsection B. then turns to the more general and complex case.
A. Border tax adjustments in the absence of distributional concerns
It is useful to start with the relatively simple case, which gives a sharp result upon which some
intuition can be built.
Proposition 3 Suppose there are only two countries, 1 and 2, with carbon taxes and taris
fixed at arbitrary levels in country 2 but unconstrained in country 1, that lump sum transfers
between the two countries are unconstrained and that compensated demands for the
non-numeraire commodities are independent of emissions (so that e jpk = 0(N 1)1). Then Pareto
eciency requires that:
(a) Carbon taxes in the unconstrained country 1 satisfy
s10 =
X2
j=1
e jk

0 ; (12)
and
(b) taris in country 1 satisfy
10 = 20 +

s1   s2
0
r2sp

e2pp   r2pp
 1
: (13)
Proof: The proof follows from Proposition 5 below by setting  j =  and e jpk = 0(N 1)1 for all
j. 
Now, and in the absence of emission eects through compensated demands (something we
return to shortly below), the Pigovian tax is set at its first-best Pigovian level. The
unconstrained tari 1 in (13) is doing two things. First, it is neutralizing the potential
production ineciency induced by the constrained tari abroad: setting 1 = 2 ensures that
producer prices in the two countries coincide. Second—and of most interest here—it is
reflecting the dierence in carbon taxes between the two countries, diering from zero only to
the extent that the carbon tax abroad is not set at its first best level. This latter element of the
Pareto ecient tari is thus a form of border tax adjustment.
The nature of the BTA called for in Proposition 3 is though somewhat complex, reflecting the
impact of carbon prices on emissions in the constrained country (through19 r2sp) and the price
19This is Copeland’s (1994) indicator of sectoral pollution intensity. The point here is also closely related to the
observation of Lockwood and Whalley (2010) that a case for BTA can arise only when dierential carbon taxes
aect relative producer prices: otherwise the exchange rate (or domestic price level) will accommodate such
dierences automatically.
12
elasticity of net imports there. This, incidentally, provides an answer to one question that has
lingered in the literature: whether the border tax adjustment should reflect technology in the
adjusting country, abroad, or some mixture of the two: Proposition 3 shows that constrained
Pareto eciency requires that adjustment (both the tari on imports and the refund on exports)
be by the latter. Indeed, if r2sp = 0N(N 1), so that there is no possibility of aecting emissions in
the constrained country by manipulating producer prices there, the cooperative case for BTA
vanishes.
To see the intuition underlying the form of BTA called for in part (b) of Proposition 3, suppose
for simplicity that (in addition to the assumptions of the proposition) all carbon taxes and
taris are zero in the constrained country, 2. Recalling that optimality requires that any
conceivable marginal changes in policy have zero impact (given the availability of
international transfers) on the sum of utilities, consider the particular policy of combining a
change in world prices, and hence of producer prices in the constrained country, of dw = dp2,
with an osetting change in the unconstrained tari, d1 =  dw. It can then be shown
(assuming for simplicity that e2pu = e2pk = 0(N 1)1), since producer prices (and the carbon tax)
in the unconstrained country are unchanged, that the consequent change in global welfare is
e1udu
1 + e2udu
2 =  
h
(e1k + e
2
k)dk + 
10 e2pp   r2ppidp2 : (14)
The first eect in (14) is simply the global social benefit of any reduction in country 2’s
emissions induced by the change in producer prices there. The second term is
 10

e2pp   r2pp

=  10dm2, which in turn is equal, in equilibrium, to 10dm1; this eect,
reflecting the impact of the reform on the distortion of trade implied by the initial tari
structure, is thus harmful to the extent that it decreases 1’s imports of goods that are subject to
a positive tari. Optimal policy implies balancing these two eects; which, since
dk =  0r2spdp2, requires
10 =

e1k + e
2
k

0r2sp

e2pp   r2pp
 1
; (15)
which, recalling part (a) of Proposition 3, is precisely as part (b) implies in this case. The kind
of policy this implies is a reduction in the producer price of ‘dirty’ goods in the constrained
country, to discourage their production there, combined with—indeed induced by—a tari that
osets the tendency for the unconstrained country to consequently import more of those dirty
goods.
A more direct piece of intuition may also be helpful. Continuing the story of the previous
paragraph, suppose that country 2 now sets its carbon tax at the Pigovian level. If, in response,
taris in country 1 are eliminated—as part (b) of Proposition 3 requires—and world prices
adjusted to leave prices p unchanged, then the change in country 2’s exports (to a linear
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approximation20) is
dm20 = 10

e2pp   r2pp

 

e1k + e
2
k

0r2sp : (16)
But (15) implies that dm2 = 0(N 1)1. That is, a collective policy response consistent with
Proposition 3 leaves country 2’s exports (roughly) unaected. Turning the point the other way:
the collectively ecient tari policy undoes (to a first approximation) the trade impact of any
country setting its carbon taxes away from the Pigovian level.
While Proposition 3 calls for what is recognizably a form of BTA—conditioning the
unconstrained tari directly on the dierence in carbon tax rates between the two countries—it
is substantially more complex than the type of BTA envisaged in practical discussions. As
noted above, in principle it is necessary to adjust the dierence in carbon taxes to reflect the
elasticities of output with respect to carbon taxes abroad and the price elasticities of foreign
import. In practice, what is commonly in mind is a more mechanical calculation (perhaps the
only type with any hope of verifiability) of charging imports (and refunding on exports) an
amount equal to the shortfall of the carbon tax actually paid abroad, directly and indirectly,
relative to that which would have been paid had the home country carbon tax been applied. To
express this in the present notation denote by B2 (p; s) the N  (N   1) matrix whose typical
element bnk denotes the production of non-numeraire good k required, in country 2, per unit of
output of good n,21 and by 2 the N  N diagonal matrix whose element n gives carbon
emissions per unit of gross output (assumed constant). Then the mechanical BTA just
described corresponds to the vector
0 =

s1   s2
0
2B2

p2

; (17)
whose elements give the amount by which the carbon tax paid per unit of output in country 2
falls short of that which would have been paid, given the production techniques used in
country 2, had the carbon tax rates of country 1 been applied.
To relate this to the more complex form of BTA called for by Proposition 3, write emissions in
country 2 as
z2 =  r2s = 2B2 (p; s) r2p (p; s) : (18)
Assuming emissions per unit of output to be constant, dierentiating (18)—using Proposition
93 of Dhyrmes (1978)—gives
 r2sp = 
h
B2 r2pp+B
2
p
i
; (19)
20And maintaining the temporary assumption that e2pu = e2pk = 0(N 1)1.
21In perhaps more familiar terms, B = (IN   A) 1 where nk denotes the input of good n required per unit of gross
output of k.
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where 2  r20p 
 IN and B2p = @vec(B) =@p. Substituting (19) into (13) and recalling (17), the
BTA of Proposition 3 can then also be written as
10 = 20  

s1   s2
0
2
h
B2 e2pp
2 +B2p
i 
e2pp   r2pp
 1
: (20)
The constrained Pareto-ecient BTA thus requires two adjustments to the mechanical form of
BTA based on technology abroad, to allow for the impact on emissions that a change in prices
abroad may have through changes in both patterns of input use (through B2p) and/or demand
(through e2pp).
It follows immediately from (20) that:
Proposition 4 In the circumstances of Proposition 3, if emissions per unit of output are
constant, there are no substitution eects in demand between non-numeraire commodities
(e2pp = 0(N 1)(N 1)), and required inputs of goods per unit of output are fixed
(B2p = 0N(N 1)(N 1)) then Pareto eciency requires that:
1 = 2 +  : (21)
Here then is a case in which collectively ecient policy has a remarkably simple form. The
unconstrained carbon tax should be set at the first-best Pigovian level, and, of particular
interest in the present context, border tax adjustment should take the form of a countervailing
charge on imports (and refund on exports) corresponding mechanically to the tax ‘under-paid’
in the foreign country. One important dierence from common proposals, however, is that, to
the extent that technologies dier between the two countries, the rebate on exports will
generally not equal the carbon tax paid at home.
Proposition 4 rests on simplifying assumptions. It does suggest, nevertheless,
that—conceptually at least—proposals for border adjusting carbon taxes commonly
encountered in policy discussion are not wholly misplaced, even from the perspective of global
rather than national welfare. Things are, of course, more complicated under the more general
conditions of Proposition 2, taken up next.
B. Border tax adjustments in the general case
Reverting to the general case in which explicit international transfers cannot be deployed, there
are many countries and pollution aects commodity demand, ecient carbon tax and tari
structures are substantially more complex:
Proposition 5 Suppose that carbon taxes and taris are freely variable in country h but
maybe constrained elsewhere. Then, at any constrained Pareto ecient allocation:
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(a) Carbon taxes in h are given by
hsh0 =
XJ
j=1
 je jk +
XJ
j,h

hh    j j
0
e jpk

0; (22)
and
(b) taris are such that
hh0 =  
XJ
j=1
 jm j0

Qh
 1
+
XJ
j,h
 j j0m jp

Qh
 1
(23)
+
XJ
j,h

hsh    js j
0
r jsp

Qh
 1
;
where Qh  PJj,hm jp :
Proof: See Appendix D. 
Part (a) of Proposition 5 shows, in contrast to Proposition 1, that the unconstrained carbon tax
in country h is not set equal to the global welfare-weighted marginal damage from emissions.
This is because the carbon tax set in h, by aecting emissions and hence demand structures in
the constrained countries, impacts distortions associated with the taris set there. To the
extent, for instance, that the fall in emissions implied by increasing the carbon tax in h
increases demand in some constrained country j of goods that tari distortions imply are
under-imported there (the tari imposed by country j being lower than any export subsidy
imposed by country h), so that

hh    j j
0
e jpk
0 > 001N , this calls for s
h to be set higher than
would otherwise be the case. In this way, the unconstrained carbon tax is used to reduce the
distortions associated with imperfections of collective tari policies. If, for example, a
warming in climate leads in country j to increased demand for heating equipment that is
subject to a large import tari, this becomes an argument for a higher carbon tax in country h.
One other aspect of part (a) bears emphasis: since sh is collinear with , the carbon tax in the
unconstrained country h should be uniform across sectors, whether or not it is uniform in the
constrained countries. The best way to respond, if need be, to sectoral dierentiation abroad, is
through the tari structure. The proper task of the carbon tax is to address ineciencies in the
aggregate level of emissions.
Part (b), characterizing Pareto ecient tari design in country j, is still more complex, with
four eects at work. The first term relates to the distributional eects of terms of trade eect
associated with varying taris in country h (vanishing if international lump sum transfers can
be deployed) and the second to the interaction with taris distortions abroad. Of most interest
here is the final term,
PJ
j,h

hsh    js j
0
r jsp

Qh
 1
. This is a BTA in the broad sense defined
in the introduction and discussed after Proposition 3, but now with carbon taxes weighted by
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income neediness,  j. Loosely speaking, in the absence of international transfers constrained
Pareto eciency requires pretending that poorer countries have higher carbon taxes than is
actually the case.
There is no entirely sharp targeting of instruments to objectives in Proposition 5: when
international transfers cannot be made, tari and carbon tax policies become closely
intertwined. There are, nevertheless fairly clearly-defined rules for the two. Carbon taxes are
addressed to global climate change and an interaction through demand eect, with tari
distortions; and taris are set with an eye partly to BTA, along the lines discussed above, and
partly to addressing equity concerns by engineering judicious movements in terms of trade.
V. Further discussion
This section compares the results above to those of Markusen (1975) for the non-cooperative
case and asks how the case for BTA is aected when countries use not carbon taxes but cap
and trade systems.
A. Comparison with non-cooperative policies
While the focus of this paper is on cooperative policy-making, the framework is suciently
general to encompass the case in which the choice of carbon tax and tari policies of country h
are motivated by national interest (as in, for example, Markusen (1975)). This can be
done—taking again country h to be the unconstrained country—simply by setting  j = 0 for
all j , h in Proposition 5 (as a simple device for attaching no welfare weight to countries other
than h). Doing so brings out how the results above dier from and build on earlier analyses of
the non-cooperative case. Proceeding in this way, Proposition 5 implies that carbon taxes
satisfy
sh0 = ehk
0 + h0
XJ
l,h
elpk
0; (24)
and tari policies are set such that
h0 =

 mh0 + ehk
XJ
l,h

0rlsp
 
Qh
 1
: (25)
Equations (24) and (25) are the many-country counterparts of Markusen (1975)—see, in
particular, his equation (15). Clearly, a unilateral response of country h (to carbon pricing and
tari policies in other countries) diers from the cooperative one, as one might expect, in two
ways: carbon taxes now reflect only national damage, not global, and taris are set in part with
a view to standard optimal tari considerations.
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B. Border tax adjustment and cap-and-trade
It has been assumed so far that the climate instruments deployed, if any, are carbon taxes. An
alternative, however, is cap-and trade: not levying a charge directly on emissions, but instead
issuing a fixed number of tradable emission rights. This alternative is of considerable practical
importance, perhaps even more so than carbon taxation: it is schemes of this kind that have
been adopted by the EU and which have made most headway in the U.S. The question then is
whether the conclusions above continue to apply when the instrument of climate policy is not
tax, but national-level cap-and-trade.
The essence of the results in Section III—when instrument choice is unconstrained—clearly
apply essentially unchanged. This is a simple consequence of the familiar equivalence, under
perfect certainty (as assumed here) of carbon taxation and cap-and-trade,22 and of the result
above that sectoral dierentiation of carbon taxation (which could not be replicated by permits
tradable between sectors) cannot be part of a Pareto-ecient allocation: analogues of
Propositions 1 and 2 thus hold with the characterizations of carbon taxes reinterpreted as
characterizing emissions caps in terms of the associated shadow value of emissions. (Whether
the pollution permits are auctioned or allocated free of charge, critical in practice, is
immaterial here, given the lump sum return of any revenues raised).
What though if, as in the earlier discussion, the instrument choice is constrained in some
country? For brevity, again assume, as in Subsection IV.A, just two countries, with lump-sum
transfers between them available.23 The critical question then is whether the constrained
countries use carbon taxation or cap-and-trade.
If the constrained country uses carbon taxation, Propositions 3-5 continue to apply even if the
unconstrained uses cap-and-trade, since any allocation that can be achieved when it uses
carbon taxation—as above—can be replicated by instead fixing the corresponding level of
domestic emissions as the cap in a trading scheme.
Matters are very dierent, however, if the constrained country uses cap-and-trade. For then
policies adopted in the unconstrained country can have no impact on emissions in the
constrained country.24 Since the sole rationale of BTA in the cooperative case is to manipulate
22There is large literature on the choice between taxation and cap-and-trade under uncertainty: see, for instance,
Pizer (2002) and Aldy et al. (2010).
23We omit proofs of the claims that follow: these are straightforward once the structure of Section 2 is
reformulated in terms of emission levels rather than carbon taxes.
24So long, that is, as the emission cap there is binding. It could in principle be that in some ecient allocations
the unconstrained country sets its taris so as to drive emissions abroad below the cap. In that case, the situation
in the constrained country is the same, at the margin, as if it set a carbon tax of zero; and so the earlier results for
that case apply.
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emissions in the constrained country, it can in this case serve no purpose. The point that
quantity restrictions in one country powerfully aect the implications of trade reform in others
is a familiar one: see for instance Copeland and Taylor (2005, pp. 123), Falvey (1988) and,
closest to the present context, Copeland (1994). The implications do not seem to have been
recognized, however, in the context of BTAs: the collective case for such adjustment depends
not only on the level of carbon prices abroad but also on the way in which any carbon pricing
there is implemented.
VI. Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the interplay between climate- and trade-related instruments in
forming globally ecient responses to climate change. One role that emerges for tari policies
is in easing the constraints stemming from cross-country distributional concerns that can make
non-uniform carbon pricing ecient. The other potential role, on which most of the analysis
has focused, is in mitigating distortions that arise from cross-country dierences in carbon
prices. The paper has identified circumstances in which global eciency does indeed require
some form of BTA (and others in which it does not), and has characterized the form of
adjustment needed.
The first role emerges most clearly when there are no constraints on the rates at which carbon
taxes (or emission levels under cap-and-trade schemes) and taris can be set. The implications
of Pareto-eciency are then straightforward: carbon prices should be uniform across sectors
within countries (or permits tradable across them), but equity considerations may call for them
to be lower in countries judged less needy. The only possible role for taris is then as an
indirect way to alleviate the underlying cross-country equity concerns that can warrant
dierent carbon prices, a task quite dierent from that of responding to distortions arising from
the dierences in carbon prices.
The second role emerges when climate change policies are constrained in countries that deploy
taxes (perhaps of zero). Global eciency requires a more purposive use of tari policy in
recognition of climate concerns: a form of BTA. It remains optimal to set those carbon prices
that can be set freely—whether explicitly by taxation or implicitly by cap-and-trade—in line
with (a simple modification of) the Pigou rule (and not to dierentiate them across sectors).
But taris should now be set so as to recognize the impact on emissions of sourcing domestic
demand from countries with carbon taxes that are inappropriate from the collective perspective.
The results here fully characterize the BTA required. This, in general, requires weighting the
shortfall in carbon taxes in the constrained country by the carbon-price responsiveness of
outputs and price elasticity of exports there and, when international transfers cannot be
deployed, treating poorer countries as if they had higher carbon taxes than is in fact the case.
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The analysis has also identified, however, one special but instructive case to which the required
BTA takes the simple form—as envisaged in practical policy debate and proposals—of a
charge on imports (and rebate on export) equal to the carbon tax ‘not paid’ abroad.
Importantly, this case for BTA does not apply if it is (binding) cap-and-trade policies, not
carbon taxation, that is the constrained instrument. This is because emissions in such countries
cannot then be aected by policies elsewhere. While there has been some discussion of the
practical dierences between implementing BTAs under carbon taxes and cap-and-trade, the
wider point that the underlying economic case for adjustment is entirely dierent in the two
cases—and much weaker under cap-and-trade—seems not to have been recognized. There
may then be a case for BTA in terms of national self-interest; but in terms of collective
eciency there is not.
The analysis here is of course severely limited in several respects. Factors have been assumed
immobile, for example, precluding the possibility of carbon leakage through location choices
that is a major concern in policy debates. And implementation of any form of BTA in any
event raises a host of legal and practical issues. What the analysis here does establish,
however, is that while practical proposals are naturally driven primarily by national (or
sectoral) self-interest, a strong conceptual case can be made for the use of BTAs along broadly
the lines often proposed—in relation to carbon taxes, but not cap-and-trade—in the more
appealing terms of global eciency.
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Appendix A: Necessary conditions for Pareto eciency
Perturbing (5), using (1), p j = w +  j and recalling that r js =  z j, gives
 judu
j    j0w dw    j0 d j  
XJ
i, j
 j=i0 d
i    j0s ds j  
XJ
i, j
 j=i0s ds
i = 0 j = 1; :::; J ; (A.1)
where
 ju  e ju    j0e jpu ; (A.2)
  j0w  m j0 +  jk
XJ
l=1

 0rlsp

+ s j0r jsp    j0m jp ; (A.3)
  j0   jk

 0r jsp

+ s j0r jsp    j0m jp ; (A.4)
  j=i0   jk

 0risp

; (A.5)
  j0s   jk

 0r jss

+ s j0r jss +  j0r
j
ps ; (A.6)
  j=i0s   jk

 0riss

; (A.7)

j
k = e
j
k    j0e jpk ; (A.8)
with (A.5) and (A.7) referring to the eects on country j of changes in carbon taxes and taris
in all other countries.
Perturbing equations (7) givesXJ
j=1
e jpudu j = ppdw+
XJ
j=1
 jppd j +
XJ
j=1
 jpsds j ; (A.9)
where
 pp 
XJ
j=1

m jp + e
j
pk
XJ
l=1

 0rlsp

; (A.10)
  jpp  m jp +
XJ
l=1
elpk

 0r jsp

; (A.11)
  jps   r jps +
XJ
l=1
elpk

 0r jss

: (A.12)
Perturbing also (4) and stacking the results along with (A.1) for all countries j and (A.9) gives
the system
udu   wdw   d   sds   d = 0(J+2N 1)1 ; (A.13)
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where the matrices u;w;;s are given by
u =
266666666666666666666666664
1u 0    0
0 2u    0
:::
:::
: : :
:::
0 0    Ju
e1pu e2pu    eJpu
0NJ
377777777777777777777777775
du =
26666666666666664
du1
du2
:::
duJ
37777777777777775
w 
2666666666666666666664
10w
:::
J0w
pp
0N(N 1)
3777777777777777777775
dw 
26666666666666664
dw2
dw3
:::
dwN
37777777777777775
 
2666666666666666666666666664
10 
1=20
    1=J0
2010 
20
    2=J0
:::
:::
: : :
:::
J=10 
J=20
    J0
1pp 
2
pp    Jpp
0NJ(N 1)
3777777777777777777777777775
d =
26666666666666664
d1
d2
:::
dJ
37777777777777775
s 
26666666666666666666666666664
10s 
1=20
s    1=J0s
2010s 
20
s    2=J0s
:::
:::
: : :
:::
J=10s 
J=20
s    J0s
1ps 
2
ps    Jps
0NJN
37777777777777777777777777775
ds 
26666666666666664
ds1
ds2
:::
dsJ
37777777777777775
 
266666666666666666666666664
 w0 00    00
00  w0    0
:::
:::
: : :
:::
00 00     w0
0¯ 0¯ 0¯ 0¯
IN IN    IN
377777777777777777777777775
d 
26666666666666664
d1
d2
:::
dJ
37777777777777775 : (A.14)
Notice that u is of dimension (J + 2N   1) J, w of dimension (J + 2N   1) (N   1),  of
(J + 2N   1)  J(N   1), s of dimension (J + 2N   1)  JN and  of dimension
(J + 2N   1)  JN.
The analysis that follows uses Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, which states (Mangasarian
(1969), p.29)) that for a system of the form in (A.13) either there exists du  0J1 and dw such
that udu + Ddx = 0 or there exists y such that
y0u  001J ; (A.15)
y0D = 00 : (A.16)
The focus is thus on solutions to necessary conditions for Pareto-eciency of the form
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y0D = 00 where D is the submatrix of D corresponding to whichever of the instruments in dx
may be deployed. For this is helpful to partition the vector y0 = (0; v0; !0) conformably with
the block structure of the matrices in (A.13). Starting from a tight equilibrium, it is required
  0J1. 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
With w; and s freely available, the conditions y0w = 00; y0 = 00 and y0s = 00 imply,
respectively, thatXJ
j=1
 j

m j0+ jk
XJ
l=1

 0rlsp

+s j0r jsp  j0m jp

+v0
XJ
j=1

m jp+e
j
pk
XJ
l=1

 0rlsp

(B.1)
=001(N 1) ;
 j
n

j
k

 0r jsp

+ s j0r jsp    j0m jp
o
+
XJ
l, j
llk

 0r jsp

+ v0

m jp +
XJ
l=1
elpk

 0r jsp

(B.2)
= 001(N 1) ; j = 1; : : : J ;
 j
n

j
k

 0r jss

+ s j0r jss +  j0r
j
ps
o
+
XJ
l, j
llk

 0r jss

+ v0

 r jps +
XJ
l=1
elpk

 0r jss

(B.3)
= 001N ; j = 1; : : : J :
Post-multiplying (B.3) by

r jss
 1
r jsp and comparing the result with left-hand-side of (B.2),
using also the definitions in (A.4)-A.7), non-singularity of m jp implies that
 j j = v; j = 1; : : : J : (B.4)
from which part (b) of the proposition follows. Part (a) follows on using (B.4) and (A.8) in
(B.3). Finally, (A.15) implies, recalling (A.2), that
 j

e ju    j0e jpu

+ v0e jpu > 0 ; j = 1; : : : J ; (B.5)
and hence, from (B.4),  j > 0; j = 1; : : : J : 
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
It suces to show that in either of the circumstances envisaged in the proposition
 j =  ; j = 1; : : : J : (C.1)
Starting with the case in which explicit lump-sum transfers are available the condition
y0 = 001J(N 1) implies (C.1). Part (a) then follows directly from part (a) of Proposition 1, and
part (b) from noting that (again from part (b) of Proposition 1) with  j = ; j = 1; : : : J; the
common tari vector can be normalized to zero.
When explicit transfers are unavailable, using (B.4) and (A.2) in the condition y0w = 001(N 1)
gives
23
XJ
j=1
 j

m j0 + e jk
XJ
l=1

 0rlsp

+ s j0r jsp

= 001(N 1) ; (C.2)
which, using part (a) of the proposition, becomes
M0= 0(N 1)1 ; (C.3)
where
M0 =
h
m1 m2    mJ
i
(N 1)J : (C.4)
Recall, from (7), that market clearing impliesM0J = 0N 1, so thatM0 has column rank of no
more that J   1. If it has precisely this rank, then J1 must be collinear with J1 implying
again that  j = ; for j = 1; : : : ; J. 
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5
In this case, with countries other than h constrained, conditions (B.2) and (B.3) can be
assumed to hold only for j = h. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1 gives
hh = v : (D.1)
Using this and (A.2) in (B.3) for j = h, part (a) follows. Using part (a) and (A.2) in (B.1) gives
part (b). 
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